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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
MICHAEL I. SPAK*
HIS PORTION of "The Survey of Illinois Law" will consider
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code through a discus-
sion of some constitutional problems and a brief survey of the
highlights of recent Illinois decisions relating to that article as well
as the proposed amendments.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In Sniadach v. Family Finance' petitioner attacked a Wisconsin
prejudgment garnishment provision as violative of the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment. In its opinion, the Court
surveyed the plight of the poor person who is enticed into an often-
times easy credit plan and subsequently subjected to wage garnish-
ment for non-payment of the debt plus collection charges. Analyz-
ing the problem, the Court cautioned that due process may be vio-
lated when summary procedures are used in extraordinary circum-
stances and noted that Wisconsin's statute was drawn too broadly
to evidence consideration of such circumstances. The Court then
spoke of wages as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system."2  Thus, recognizing such pre-
judgment garnishment as a taking of property, the Court concluded
"that absent notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment procedure
violates the fundamental principles of due process."'
Sniadach spawned two approaches in subsequent decisions deal-
ing with the problem of such summary prejudgment remedies as
confessions of judgment, wage garnishments, and replevin statutes.
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University; J.D., DePaul University
College of Law; LL.M., Northwestern University School of Law.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. Id. at 340.
3. Id. at 341-42.
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One line of decisions held that Sniadach called for an analysis of
(1) the type of property involved, i.e., is the property essential or
nonessential for day-to-day living? and (2) the statutory language
i.e., is the statute drawn to meet special circumstances? Under both
analytical methods, prejudgment garnishment of wages was found to
be a denial of due process.4 The second line of decisions applied
Sniadach solely to situations involving prejudgment garnishment of
wages without recognizing the two-pronged analysis perceived by
the other courts.5
The United States Supreme Court apparently resolved the dichot-
omy in Fuentes v. Shevin6 when it reviewed the decision of a three-
judge district court which had upheld the constitutionality of a
state statute authorizing the summary seizure of goods under a writ
of replevin issued to anyone who claimed a right to the property and
posted a security bond. Responding to those courts which required
a hearing only prior to deprivation of "necessary" property, the Su-
preme Court denied any basis in Sniadach and, indeed, in the Con-
stitution for such a distinction. It declared that the "Fourteenth
Amendment speaks of 'property' generally"7 and it is not within the
province of the courts to determine the categories of property which
due process will protect.
The Court granted that in some circumstances failure to provide
notice and a hearing before repossession was justified, but noted
that such an extraordinary situation was one where the "seizure...
4. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Ho-
tel Corporation, 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.
Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716
(N.D. N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v.
Appellate Dept. of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709,
488 P.2d 13 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242
(1971); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969); Jones Press
v. Motor Travel Services, 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
5. Reeves v. Motor Contract Co. of Ga., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American
Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v.
Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa
Co., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); 300 W. 154th Street Realty Co. v. De-
partment of Buildings, 26 N.Y.2d 538, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899, 260 N.E.2d 534 (1970);
and last, but not least, Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
6. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See Swygert, 22 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW (1972).
7. Id. at 90.
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[is] directly necessary to secure an important governmental or gen-
eral public interest."'  Therefore, to preserve their constitutionality,
state statutes would have to be drawn so that their "special circum-
stances" met this standard.
To the contention that one who holds property under an install-
ment contract does not have full title and is therefore not entitled
to a hearing prior to its seizure, the Court declared that the four-
teenth amendment's protection extends "to any significant property
interest."'  Lack of full title, then, does not preclude notice and a
hearing before repossession of property.
Finally, where a secured party contends that a debtor has signed
a waiver of his constitutional rights to notice and a hearing prior to
seizure of his property, the Court insisted that such a waiver "must,
at the very least, be clear."'" In order to be effective, then, a waiver
of notice and hearing must be stated in very clear terms.
Noting that this constitutional right to be heard prior to seizure of
property was intended "to protect [one's] use and possession of
property from arbitrary encroachment,"'" the Court concluded that
the prejudgment replevin statute in question deprived the posses-
sors' of their property without due process of law and was therefore
unconstitutional. Further, the Court added that the quality of a
hearing must be such that it is "aimed at establishing the validity,
or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim of the al-
leged debtor."' 2
Turning to Article 9,13 it is apparent that self-help, summary
repossession of collateral upon default by a secured creditor without
a breach of the peace, is authorized by UCC 9-503, but may be as
unconstitutional as the indiscriminate prejudgment replevin scheme
8. id. at 91.
9. Id. at 86.
10. Id. at 95.
11. Id. at 81.
12. Id. at 97.
13. Recently the case of Mojca v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 72 C 686
(N.D. Ill.) was filed in federal district court in Illinois and assigned to a 3-judge
panel. This case seeks a declaration of invalidity with respect to the Illinois stat-
utes (ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, §§ 9-503, 504) insofar as they allow the repossession
and sale of a debtor's automobile without notice to the owner-debtor and a pre-repos-
session opportunity to be heard. Whether the court will follow the reasoning in
Fuentes and strike down these repossession statutes remains to be seen.
19721
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denounced in Fuentes. Both deprive the debtor of property rights
without a hearing and may be included in the initial security agree-
ment to be cursorily approved by the unsuspecting buyer. At this
writing, three federal district courts have faced the constitutional
problems of self-help with varying results.
In Adams v. Egley,14 the southern California district court found
self-help to be unconstitutional by an extension of Sniadach toward
the same type of conclusion in Fuentes-seizure of property without
a hearing is contra the fourteenth amendment. The northern Cali-
fornia district court, however, dismissed an action involving the same
issue for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Oller v. Bank of Amer-
ica." The court held that for jurisdiction to lie, some sort of "state
action" depriving the plaintiff of his property must be shown'6
whereas the court in Adams had no difficulty finding such "state
action" in UCC 9-503.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court will consider the
constitutional problems in self-help. The Adams pro-Sniadach ar-
guments appear to be valid; but the Oller argument against the
presence of "state action" may prevail, especially in light of Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,17 handed down the same day as Fuentes,
which declined to find a "state action" in the licensing of a private
club that discriminated against a Negro guest. Speculation may
suggest that the Court may similarly refuse to find "state action" in
self-help when Adams, or a case like it, is brought before it. In the
meantime, several leading finance houses have ceased reposses-
sions.
RECENT CASES
This past year has seen some interesting Illinois cases concerning
deficiency judgments, blank spaces on contracts, automobile certifi-
cates of title, and secured party rights against a bankrupt debtor.
14. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
15. 10 UCC REP. SERV. 877 (Dist. Ct. N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1972); accord Mc-
Cormick v. First National Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1969). Accordingly the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides, inter alia, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."
17. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super.
1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
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Northern Trust Co. v. Kuykendall8 involved § 247 of the Retail
Installment Sales Act. 19 The Illinois appellate court ruled that the
failure of a secured party to notify the defaulting buyer of the pro-
posed sale of repossessed collateral renders the secured party unable
to recover a deficiency judgment after the sale.
Obviously, the secured party is severely penalized by a forfeiture
of his right to a deficiency judgment, but the statute was presumably
enacted to elevate the buyer to an equal position with the seller, in-
ducing both parties to comply with the laws applicable to secured
transactions or face a financial loss. Otherwise, the secured party
could sell the collateral without notice to the debtor and still collect
the deficiency, notwithstanding the protestations of the debtor whose
interests were not protected at the sale.
When § 247 was repealed, the controlling statute on the subject
became Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 26, § 9-507. "If the disposi-
tion has occurred the debtor . . . has a right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provi-
sions of this Part." The apparent meaning of this section is that
should a sale of collateral worth $500, bringing in only $100, occur
without notification of the debtor, the secured party would be liable
for the $400 difference-the loss caused by the failure to give notice
because had the debtor had the opportunity to be present at the sale,
a fair price would have been presumably offered. A problem arises
if, in this transaction, a balance of $300 should remain on the debt
and the secured creditor attempts to recover the deficiency balance.
A strict reading of the section suggests that the deficiency balance
is recoverable, but many courts and writers2° have interpreted the
18. - I11. App. -, 273 N.E.2d 526 (1971).
19. The transaction occurred in 1967 and was governed by ILL. REV. STAT.
1965 ch. 1211/2, § 247 (repealed laws, 1967, eff. Jan. 1, 1968). "If the holder
does not resell the goods within a reasonable time after retaking, he shall be
deemed to have elected to retain the goods and release the buyer from any further
obligations under the contract." "Resale" is considered to be a proper resale ac-
cording to the law, including notice. 273 N.E.2d at 528.
20. Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1972); Dynalectron v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla.
1972); In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1144 (Ref. W.D. Mich. 1971);
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, (W.D. Pa. 1963), modi-
fied on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1969); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v.
Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970); Braswell v. American National Bank,
117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40
1972]
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Code to mean that compliance with the notice requirements is a
condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency judgment. In ac-
cord with the latter interpretation, the Illinois appellate court in
Morris Plan Co. of Bettendorf v. Johnson21 held that a violation of
the UCC notice requirements prior to resale has "the legal effect
of extinguishing the obligations of the defendants on their note. '2
Zimmerman Ford Co. v. Cheney23 looked into the purpose of the
statute that prohibits enforcement by the seller of a retail installment
contract which is blank when signed by the buyer.24 The Illinois
appellate court found that the statute was adopted to prevent exces-
sive charges or other fraud by a seller who would fill in blanks in an
unauthorized manner but noted that the document in the instant case
was completed according to the agreement of the parties. Holding
that the statute could "not be applied in a manner which would give
a party a windfall," '25 the court declared the contract fully enforce-
able.
Town House Motel, Inc. v. Ward26 involved an action wherein a
judgment plaintiff levied on the defendant's automobile. The mort-
gagee bank intervened. The automobile was purchased in Illinois
by a serviceman stationed in Illinois, but was registered in Ohio,
Mass. App. Dec. 64, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 792 (1968); Cities Service Oil Co. v.
Ferris, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 899 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1971); Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1971);
4 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504:28, § 9-504:30 (1971);
2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 449.4 (1965); Clark,
Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Under-
world and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302, 318-22 (1972); Kennedy,
Secured Transactions, 27 Bus. L.J. 755, 772-73 (1972); Note, Debtor's Rights Against
a Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9, 16 How. L.J. 148, 151 (1970). Contra,
Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Weaver
v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy,
114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971); Investors Acceptance Co. v. James
Talcott, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970); Grant County Tractor Co.
v. Nuss, 496 P.2d 966 (Wash. App. 1972); Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure 2
UCC L.J. 244, 257 (1970); Comment, The Damage Award for Improper Distribu-
tion of Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 ORE. L. REV. 65, 68-70
(1969).
21. - I1l. App. -,271 N.E.2d 404 (1971).
22. Id. at 408.
23. -Ill. App.-, 271 N.E.2d 682 (1971).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 229 (1965), (now ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
121%, § 515 (1965)).
25. 271 N.E.2d at 685.
26. 2 Ill. App. 3d 699, 276 N.E.2d 809 (1971).
182 [Vol. XXII: 177
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where the mortgagee's security interest was noted on the Ohio Cer-
tificate of Title. After obtaining a judgment, plaintiff levied on the
serviceman's automobile. Prior to the subsequent sale, the judgment
creditor checked the local county Recorder of Deeds office and did
not find any record of liens. The president of Town House Motel
was the only bidder, and subsequent to purchase he obtained an
Illinois title. The issue presented was whether the mortgagee was
required to have a certificate of title issued by the State of Illinois
with its security interest noted therein, in order to protect its lien
and security interest, as against the motel. 27  The motel contended
that the bank failed to perfect its lien in Illinois as prescribed in the
Illinois Vehicle Code. 2  However, the appellate court pointed out
that the Illinois Vehicle Code states that a certificate of title need
not be obtained for "a vehicle owned by a non-resident of this state
and not required by law to be registered in this state." The original
purchaser was a serviceman stationed in Illinois.29 Further, the
27. The court considered ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-103(4): "... if personal
property is covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any
other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any security
interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the perfection is governed
by the law of the jurisdiction, which issued the certificate."
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , § 3-202 (1971), "(a) Unless excepted by Sec-
tion 3-201, a security interest in a vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title
is .required is not valid against subsequent tranferees or lienholders of the vehicle
unless perfected as provided in this Act.
(b) A security interest is perfected by the delivery to the Secretary of State of the
existing certificate of title, if any, an application for a certificate of title contain-
ing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his security agreement
and the required fee. It is perfected as of the time of its creation if the delivery
is completed within 21 days thereafter, otherwise as of the time of delivery.
(c) If a vehicle is subject to a security interest when brought into this State, the
validity of the security interest is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where
the vehicle was when the security interest attached, subject to the following:
1. If the parties understood at the time the security interest attached that the
vehicle would be kept in this State and it was brought into this State within 30
days thereafter for purposes other than transportation through this State, the
validity of the security interest in this State is determined by the law of this
State.
2. If the security interest was perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where
the vehicle was when the security interest attached, the following rules apply:
(a) If the name of the lienholder is shown on an existing certificate of title
issued by that jurisdiction, his security interest continues perfected in this
State."
29. It is not unusual for a soldier on temporary military assignment in one
state to maintain vehicle registration in another state. In fact, this is the basis for
the Soldiers & Sailors (and Airmens) Civil Relief Act.
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motel contended that the Uniform Commercial Code cannot apply
because the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act provides the exclusive method
in Illinois for perfecting security interests in motor vehicles.30 The
court concluded that the motor vehicle in question was not subject
to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act. They noted:
Where two statutes are enacted which have relation to the same subject, the
earliest continues in force unless the two are clearly inconsistent with and repug-
nant to each other or unless in the latest statute some express notice is taken of
the former plainly indicating an intention to repeal it, and where two acts are
seemingly repugnant, they should, if possible, be so construed that the later may
not operate as a repeal of the former by implication ...
The basic structure of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was to provide
for the creation of a security interest with an established priority and a means of
giving notice of that interest to third parties. . . . The Bank did establish its priority
and notice of that interest was given to third parties, including the Motel. The
Motel knew the automobile was bearing Ohio license plates and thus knew that
some registration or application for license was filed in that state. The Motel
also knew that Major Ward was in the military . . . . Since the evidence is
undisputed that the Bank did perfect its lien in Ohio, we hold that the provisions
of Section 9-103 (4) of the Uniform Commercial Code apply to the present
action.31
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 3-207 (1971), reads: "The method provided
in this act of perfecting and giving notice of security interests subject to this act is
exclusive."
31. 2 Ill. App. at 704, 276 N.E.2d at 813. Similarly, this past year the Texas
Supreme Court handed down an interesting decision affecting automobile titles vis-a-
vis perfection in foreign jurisdictions, Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1971). An Oklahoma dealer sold a car, as-
signed its security interest to Security Investment Corporation (SIC), and the lat-
ter filed in the county in which the buyer was domiciled. (This is sufficient for
perfection under Oklahoma law as notation on the certificate of title itself is not re-
quired). The buyer, signing the reverse side of his title certificate, transferred the
automobile to one Dignan. Dignan then received an Oklahoma certificate of ti-
tle in his own name and removed the car to Texas, where he obtained a Texas certifi-
cate of title. Thereafter, Dignan sold the automobile to Phil Phillips Ford, Inc.,
executing a power of attorney authorizing an officer of the corporation to transfer
the title. Meanwhile, the original buyer defaulted in payments so SIC repossessed
the car from Ford's lot and brought it to Oklahoma. Ford sued for conversion in a
Texas court and SIC received a summary judgment. Ford appealed.
Relying on UCC 9-103(d), the court noted "that if the property is, at the time of
a transaction, covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute which requires
notation on the title to perfect a security interest, perfection will be determined un-
der the law of the state which issued the certificate" (at 937). Therefore, a bona
fide purchaser and transferee of Dignan's Texas certificate would have received a
clear title. However, the plot thickened. Ford had not exercised Dignan's power of
attorney until after SIC repossessed the car. Further, the Texas Certificate of Title
Act states that title to a motor vehicle cannot be passed except by a transfer of the
certificate-requiring an affidavit by the transferor that there are no liens against
the vehicle except those shown (Vernon's Ann. P.C. art. 1436-1, § 33). There-
fore, while the sale between the parties (Dignan and Ford) may have been valid, it
[Vol. XXII: 177
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
And finally, A vco Finance Co. v. Erickson3 involved a secured
creditor attempting to recover allegedly converted collateral from
an adjudicated bankrupt debtor. At the hearing, the debtor raised
the affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy, and the court
ruled for the debtor because the creditor failed to file a reclamation
petition for the collateral. The Illinois appellate court reversed
this ruling because the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy is personal
to him and does not act "as a release of liens or security interests
in property owned by him.""3  A reclamation petition is needed
only if possession of the bankrupt's property rests in a court-ap-
pointed officer, which was not the case here. Therefore, the secured
creditor could bring an action in conversion against the bankrupt
debtor for the collateral, or the proceeds34 from its sale.
PROPOSED CHANGES IN ARTICLE 9
In late December 1971, the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code finalized proposals for changes in Article
9 of the UCC and related changes in other articles. Finalization
came with the approval of last minute changes by both drafting or-
ganizations, The American Law Institute and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Bills incorporating these proposed changes have already been and/
or are shortly expected to be introduced in most codal jurisdictions
(all states have adopted the Code, except Louisiana) including Illi-
nois. Enactment of the proposed changes by all codal jurisdictions
is anticipated within the next two years.
The areas of revision, both major and minor, are broad indeed-
affecting conflict of laws,35 filing,36 priorities, 7 and default.38  Ob-
viously, a detailed explanation of the codal changes is beyond the
was void as to third parties. In this light, SIC's interest, although unperfected,
was superior to Phillips Ford's interest, so SIC's repossession was not a theft, and
Ford could not prevail against its loss insurer, the defendant insurance company.
32. - Ill. App. -, 270 N.E.2d 111 (1971).
33. Id. at 112.
34. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306 (1969).
35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-105, 9-102 and 9-103.
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-103, 9-302, 9-401, 9-402 and 9-403.
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301, 9-307 and 9-312.
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-501, 9-502, 9-504 and 9-505.
1972]
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scope of this survey.39 The major flaw in the revisions, however,
should be noted. They do not take into consideration the recent
constitutional problems. Although, of course, these cases postdate
the revisions, one shall have "seen the handwriting on the wall."
CONCLUSION
Any, even hasty, consideration of secured transactions will result in
at least one conclusion. Increasingly the commercial lawyer has the
obligation of dissecting Supreme Court opinions. No longer can he
rely on the Uniform Commercial Code as "The Bible." The UCC
is obviously no more immune from attack than is a perfected security
interest.
39. See 27 Bus. LAWYER 321 (1972); 27 Bus. LAWYER 1465 (1972).
